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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, Robert Cover wrote of an "explosion of legal 
scholarship placing interpretation at the crux of the enterprise of 
law."' As examples of this phenomenon, Cover cited the works 
of such influential scholars as Ronald Dworkin2 and James Boyd 
White,3 as well as law review symposia,4 which, Cover noted, fo-
cused on "interpretation" or "hermeneutics. "5 As part of the 
continuing emphasis on hermeneutics in constitutional interpre-
tation, a body of literature has emerged comparing constitu-
tional textual analysis to Biblical hermeneutics." This scholar-
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1. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, Y5 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601-02 n.2 (1986 ). 
2. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Belknap Press, 1986). 
3. See James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow (U. of Wisconsin Press, 1985); James 
Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning (U. of Chicago Press, 1984). 
4. See Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 ( 1985); Symposium, Law and 
Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982). 
5. Cover, 95 Yale L.J. at 1602 n.2 (cited in note 1 ). 
6. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Book Review, 11 Const. Comm. 5YY (1YY4-95) (reviewing 
H. Jefferson Powell, The Moral Tradition of American Constitwionalism: A Theological 
Interpretation); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos 
and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983); David R. Dow, Constitwional Midrash: The 
Rabbis' Solution to Professor Bickel's Problem, 29 Houston L. Rev. 543 (1 YY2); Edward 
M. Gaffney, Jr., Politics Without Brackets on Religious Com·ictions: Michael Perry and 
Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64 Tulane L. Rev. 1143, 1166 n.102 (1990); Thomas C. 
Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1984); Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Supreme Court, /992 Term-Foreword: The Constitwion of Change: Legal Fundamental-
ity Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 48-51 & 50 n.90 (1993); Interpretation 
Symposium (cited in note 4); Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Con-
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ship has been based on the recognition that, like the Constitu-
tion, the Bible functions as an authoritative legal text that must 
be interpreted in order to serve as the foundation for a living 
community. 
This Essay looks at a basic hermeneutic device common to 
both Biblical and constitutional interpretation, the identification 
of unenumerated principles through reference to textually enu-
merated principles. The Essay observes that, in addition to the 
numerous obligations listed in the Torah, legal authorities have 
interpreted the Torah to impose many other obligations not 
enumerated in the text. The Essay suggests that a similar meth-
odology to that employed in Jewish law has been applied to the 
United States Constitution to derive rights beyond those enu-
merated in the text. The Essay thus examines the ways in which 
American judges and constitutional scholars have relied on 
forms of textual analysis that find analogues in the interpretation 
of the Torah by Jewish legal authorities. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND "YOU SHALL BE 
HOLY" 
Despite its function as the guarantor of individual rights 
against infringement by the government, the United States Con-
stitution, including the Bill of Rights, is surprisingly limited in its 
enumeration of substantive rights. 7 Nevertheless, the United 
States Supreme Court has consistently held that the Constitution 
protects a number of rights beyond those listed in the text. To 
support these conclusions, the Court has engaged in a variety of 
interpretive techniques that, to a significant extent, parallel vari-
ous methods of Biblical interpretation. 
In the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska,s the Supreme Court 
was faced with a challenge to a Nebraska state law which pro-
hibited the teaching of "any language other than the English 
stitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 Hastings Const. L. Q. 441 (1997); 
Sanford Levinson, Constiwtional Faith (Princeton U. Press, 1988); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 Tulane L. Rev. 1599 (1989); Steven D. Smith, 
Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Va. L. Rev. 583 (1993). 
7. In fact, as Professor Charles Black has observed, "[i]f one ... looks over th[e] 
canvas of textually expressed guarantees of human rights against actions of the States, one 
has to be impressed with their entire inadequacy, by a very wide margin, as a corpus of 
human-rights substantive protections that could possibly characterize any society gener-
ally as a free society by law." Charles L. Black, Jr., "One Nation Indivisible": Unnamed 
Human Rights in the States, 65 St. John's L. Rev. 17, 21 (1991 ). 
8. 262 u.s. 3<)() (1923). 
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language" prior to high school.9 Though the text of the Constitu-
tion does not explicitly protect the right to education, the Court 
found that such a right is guaranteed by the Constitution, and 
held that the Nebraska statute violated the individual's right to 
pursue and select a reasonable and beneficial means of educa-
tion. 
In recognizing this unnamed right, the Court relied on and 
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees that 
"[n]o State shall ... deprive any raerson of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." ° Focusing on the ambiguity of 
the word "liberty," the Court understood the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect a broad range of rights, including 
[w]ithout doubt ... not merely freedom from bodily restraint 
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, 
to worship God according to the dictates of his own con-
science, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.'' 
Turning to education, the Court stated that "[t]he American 
people have always regarded education and acquisition of 
knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be 
diligently promoted. "'2 Therefore, the Court concluded that the 
teacher's "right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage 
him so to instruct their children ... are within the liberty of the 
Amendment." 13 The Nebraska law violated the Constitution be-
cause it "attempted materially to interfere with the calling of 
modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to 
acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the 
education of their own." 14 
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 15 a Catholic 
parochial school and private military academy challenged an 
Oregon statute requiring children between the ages of eight and 
sixteen to attend public school. Relying on Meyer, the Court 
found it "entirely plain" that the statute "unreasonably inter-
9. ld. at 397. 
10. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV,§ 1. 
11. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
12. ld. at 400. 
13. ld. 
14. !d. at 401. 
15. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
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feres with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up-
bringing and education of children under their control. "16 Elabo-
rating on the concept of liberty, the Court declared that 
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all govern-
ments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the 
State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept in-
struction from public school teachers only .... [T]hose who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with 
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations. 17 
The Court's approach in these two cases reflects a willing-
ness to look beyond those rights enumerated in the text of the 
Constitution, by suggesting that additional rights are encom-
passed under the Fourteenth Amendment's broad guarantee of 
"liberty." According to the Court, the term "liberty" clearly in-
cludes a wide range of activities and privileges-such as educa-
tion- that, although absent from the constitutional text, are ap-
parently so basic to the idea of freedom as to make their 
enumeration unnecessary. The Court's approach, relying on 
what is commonly called "substantive due process," raised some 
criticism when applied in certain areas of the law/8 but the influ-
ence of Meyer and Pierce continues to be seen in the Court's fur-
ther articulation of unenumerated rights. 
In the 1977 case, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 19 for ex-
ample, the Court held unconstitutional a housing ordinance that 
prohibited a woman from living in her home with her two grand-
sons. In his plurality opinion, Justice Powell noted that " [a] host 
of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer ... and Pierce ... have 
consistently acknowledged a 'private realm of family life which 
the state cannot enter. "'20 Indeed, relying on the concept of sub-
stantive due process, the opinion further observed that "[t]his 
Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in 
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
16. Id. at 534-35. 
17. ld. at 535. 
18. Even those justices who have relied on substantive due process have acknowl-
edged that "[s]ubstantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this 
Court."' Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,502 (1977) (Powell, J.). 
19. 431 u.s. 494 (1977). 
20. Id. at 499 (Powell, J.) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944)). 
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ment."21 The opinion included in this area of liberty the right of a 
grandmother to live with her grandchildren. 
As Justice Powell conceded, the right he articulated was not 
only absent from the text of the Constitution, but had not been 
identified in prior case law. In response to the criticism of the 
dissenters in the case, however, Justice Powell insisted that "un-
less we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights as-
sociated with the family have been accorded shelter under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid 
applying the force and rationale of these precedents to the fam-
ily choice involved in this case."22 Justice Powell quoted exten-
sively from an earlier opinion of Justice Harlan, which explained 
that 
the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of 
the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitu-
tion. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked 
out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, 
press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the free-
dom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is 
a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a 
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and pur-
poseless restraints. 23 
Thus, Justice Powell relied on Justice Harlan's eloquent 
declaration that a proper understanding of the guarantees of lib-
erty requires looking beyond the specific rights enumerated in 
the Constitution, to uncover the underlying principles those 
rights represent. According to Justice Powell, these principles 
mandate protecting "the sanctity of the family precisely because 
the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition."24 He concluded that "[t]he tradition of ... 
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and chil-
dren has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of consti-
tutional recognition. "25 
This tradition of interpreting the term "liberty" expansively 
parallels Jewish legal interpretation of the Torah. The Torah, 
21. Id. (quoting Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 
(1974)). 
22. Id. at 501 (Powell, J.). 
23. ld. at 502 (Powell, J.) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
24. !d. at 503 (Powell, J. ). 
25. ld. at 504 (Powell, J.). 
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the Five Books of Moses, is the primary source of Jewish law 
and religious obligations. Through the commandments, the To-
rah enumerates a large number of obligations and prohibitions 
incumbent upon both individuals and the community as a whole. 
In fact, according to most methods of counting, the Torah lists 
613 commandments, many of which may in turn be analyzed to 
include more than a single obligation or prohibition. Yet, de-
spite the large number of enumerated commandments, which 
provide a somewhat comprehensive guide to religious life, the 
text of the Torah, like the Constitution, does not detail every 
area of human behavior.26 
Thus, just as the Constitution is understood and interpreted 
to protect rights that are not listed explicitly, the Biblical text is 
understood and interpreted to impose unenumerated religious 
obligations. Parallel to the Supreme Court's reliance on the 
concept of "liberty" found in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause as a broad directive to guarantee unnamed rights, 
some Jewish lepal authorities have relied on the command "you 
shall be holy"2 as broadly mandating adherence to unenumer-
ated obligations and prohibitions. 
In his commentary on the Torah, Nachmanides, one of the 
most influential of Medieval Jewish legal scholars, discusses the 
use of this command as a source for unnamed obligations. Citing 
Talmudic sources that interpret the concept of "holiness" as in-
volving separation from improper activities, Nachmanides ob-
serves that the Torah lists a number of activities to be avoided.28 
For example, the Torah contains various dietary laws, listing 
foods that are not kosher and describing the manner in which 
kosher food must be prepared. Nachmanides notes, however, 
that the Torah does not enumerate all religious obligations re-
lating to food, such as prohibitions against gluttony and drunk-
29 
enness. 
Indeed, like the Constitution, which enumerates certain 
rights but does not mention explicitly the areas of "liberty" re-
lating to education and family life, the Torah does not detail all 
26. Robert Cover has explored the substantive difference between the American 
legal system's focus on rights and the Jewish legal system's focus on obligations. See 
Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & Rei. 
65 (1987). This paper focuses on the similarity in interpretive methodologies in the two 
systems rather than on the substantive interpretations themselves. 
27. Leviticus 19:2. 
28. See 2 Nachmanides, Commentary on the Torah 115-16 (Chaim Chavel, ed., 
Mossad Harav Kook, 1960) (commenting on Leviticus 19:2) (author's translation). 
29. See id. 
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aspects of "holiness." Instead, in addition to listing a number of 
obligations relating to the concept of "holiness," the Torah 
commands a general obligation to "be holy." Jewish legal 
authorities, whose judicial function includes interpreting the re-
ligious text, viewed the broad principle of "holiness" as an ex-
tension of those obligations found in the text, analogous to the 
function of the broad constitutional term "liberty" in relation to 
those rights found in the text of the Constitution. 
Through an analysis parallel to that employed by the Court 
in Meyer and Pierce, and by Justice Powell in Moore, the rab-
binic authorities looked to the religious tradition to define the 
scope of activity implicit in the command to "be holy." Thus, for 
example, the authorities viewed the Biblical stories describing 
the sinful behavior that resulted from the drunkenness of Noah 
and Lot as implying that drunkenness is inconsistent with holi-
ness. Using this method, rabbinic authorities concluded that the 
command required abstention from various activities beyond 
those explicitly prohibited in the text of the Torah, that contra-
dict the concept of holiness, including improper modes of eating, 
speech, dress, and sexual activity.30 
III. PRIVACY, PENUMBRAS AND "YOU SHALL DO THE 
JUST AND THE GOOD" 
Another area in which the Supreme Court has identified 
constitutionally protected rights beyond those in the text is the 
sphere of privacy. The Court's approach in this area has been 
similar to its approach in identifying liberty rights, though the 
Court has employed a somewhat different methodology. Like-
wise, the Court's approach to privacy finds its parallels in Jewish 
religious interpretation of the command in Deuteronomy to "do 
the just and the good," which appears to differ slightly from the 
method of interpreting the command to "be holy." 
The concept of a right to privacy in American law is an old 
one. Constitutional amendments protecting the rights of crimi-
nal defendants indicate a fundamental appreciation for an indi-
vidual's privacy rights, reflected in Supreme Court decisions in 
the criminal procedure context. However, it was not until the 
1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut31 that the Court focused on 
30. See also Maimonides, Mishne Torah, Laws of De'oth 3:2, 5:1-13 (Mossad Harav 
Kook, 1990); Nachmanides, 2 Commentary at 151-52 (cited in note 2X) (commenting on 
Leviticus 23:24). 
31. 381 U.S.479(1%5). 
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a ~eneral constitutional protection of the individual's right of 
pnvacy. 
In Griswold, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a 
state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. Although the 
Constitution obviously does not enumerate a right to use a con-
traceptive, or even a general right to privacy, the Court held that 
the rights enumerated in the Constitution should not be read as 
narrow or exclusive declarations of those rights that are to be 
protected. Instead, the Court stated, "specific guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substance."32 
In order to connect the concept of a "penumbra" to some of 
its earlier decisions, the Court focused on the "penumbra" ema-
nating from the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 
The Court cited cases which it understood to recognize that "the 
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected 
from governmental intrusion. "33 For example, although the First 
Amendment does not enumerate a "freedom of association," in 
a 1958 case the Court had identified the "freedom to associate 
and privacy in one's associations" as a "peripheral First 
Amendment right.34 The Court in Griswold explained that 
"while [association] is not expressly included in the First 
Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express 
guarantees fully meaningful. "3; 
Moreover, the Court found, other aspects of the unenumer-
ated right to privacy emanated from other enumerated rights. 
Accordin~ to the Court, "[v]arious guarantees create zones of 
privacy."3 Thus, the Court found that the Third Amendment's 
protection against the quartering of soldiers in a house during 
peacetime without the owner's consent represents "another facet 
of that privacy. "37 
Similarly, the Court had previously observed that the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments' protections of criminal defen-
dants' rights recoRnized the "sanctity of a man's home and the 
privacies of life."- In fact, the Court had explicitly stated that 
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
32. I d. at 484. 
33. I d. at 483. 
34. Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958)). 
35. Id. 
36. ld. at 484. 
37. ld. 
38. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886)). 
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searches and seizures created a "right to privacy, no less impor-
tant than anx other right carefully and particularly reserved to 
the people." 9 Likewise, the Court in Griswold found that the 
Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination "en-
ables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government 
may not force him to surrender to his detriment."40 Finally, the 
Court pointed to the Ninth Amendment's explicit statement that 
"[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people. "41 
Turning then to the Connecticut statute that prohibited the 
use of contraceptives, the Court described the case as "con-
cern[ing] a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created 
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."42 Declaring a 
respect for "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" the Court 
concluded that "[t]he very idea" of allowing the police to search 
such areas for contraceptives "is repulsive to the notions of pri-
vacy surrounding the marriage relationship. "43 
The Court's reliance on the concept of "penumbras" in 
Griswold and subsequent cases was controversial. A number of 
Justices in Griswold either concurred in the decision but relied 
on other modes of analysis, or dissented outright. In his dis-
senting opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, asked 
rhetorically "[w]hat provision of the Constitution ... does make 
the state law invalid? The Court says it is the right of privacy 
'created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.' With 
all deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the 
Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any 
case ever before decided by this Court. "44 
The Court's extension of its holding in Griswold to other 
contexts engendered more controversy. In 1972, in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird,45 the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute prohib-
iting distribution of contraceptives to single persons, stating that 
"[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the in-
dividual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
39. Id. at 485 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (1961)). 
40. Id. at 484. 
41. U.S. Const., Amend. IX. 
42. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
43. Id. at 485-86. 
44. Id. at 530 (Stewart, 1., dissenting). 
45. 405 u.s. 438 (1971). 
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person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."46 Chief 
Justice Burger's dissent, though it did not challenge the authority 
of Griswold, referred to its "tenuous moorings to the text of the 
Constitution. "47 Additionally, the Chief Justice criticized the 
Court in Eisenstadt for "pass[ing] beyond the penumbras of the 
specific guarantees into the uncircumscribed area of personal 
predilections. ,41< 
Notwithstanding such criticisms, however, the majority of 
the Court prevailed in identifying unenumerated rights through 
an extension of the principles embodied in those rights actually 
enumerated in the constitutional text. The Court determined 
that an analysis of several amendments pointed clearly to the 
underlying principle of a general, more encompassing right of 
privacy. Similarly, in Jewish thought, in addition to those obliga-
tions articulated in the text or implied through the explicit con-
cept of holiness, many obligations are subsumed under the more 
general concept of doing "the just and the good. "49 
The command to "be holy" provides a textual basis for a 
broad obligation to refrain from activities that conflict with the 
concept of holiness. Yet, both the enumerated commands gen-
erally associated with "holiness" -such as eating kosher food-
as well as those imperatives cited by Nachmanides and other 
legal authorities as examples of "holiness" and "separation"-
such as refraining from drunkenness- are largely restricted to 
one area of obligation in Jewish thought, involving the 
relationship between a human being and God. The other major 
area of obligation, though also reflecting on an individual's 
relationship to God, involves primarily those commandments 
relating to interpersonal relationships. In this area as well, 
although the Torah lists many commandments, these commands 
are not a comprehensive list of obligations. Rather, rabbinic 
authorities found that many unenumerated obligations are 
mandated by the general obligation to "do the just and the 
good." 
Like his explanation of the command to "be holy," Nach-
manides' discussion of the command to "do the just and the 
good" is instructive. Nachmanides again explains the reasoning 
behind the rabbinic interpretations, through which Jewish legal 
authorities derived principles of obligation in interpersonal rela-
46. !d. at 453. 
47. !d. at 472 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
48. !d. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
49. Deuteronomy 6:18. 
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tionships beyond those enumerated in the text. Looking at the 
context of the command, Nachmanides notes that the previous 
verse commands observance of the laws "which [God) has com-
manded you. "50 The next verse, then, describing a more general 
obligation to do the "just and the good," apparently refers to 
obligations other than and beyond those which God has ex-
pressly commanded.51 As Nachmanides further explains, the 
second verse is necessary because it would be impossible for the 
Torah to prescribe the proper mode of behavior for e_very situa-
tion that arises in the course of interpersonal dealings.'2 
Instead, according to Nachmanides, the Torah enumerates 
numerous obligations and prohibitions that are fundamental to 
the way humans should treat each other, including, among many 
othe~s, respecti~~ elder~, preventi!'lg harm to othe~s, and not 
seekmg revenge. · Yet, hke those nghts enumerated m the Con-
stitution, these commandments all have their own penumbras, 
formed by emanations creating a "zone of the just and the 
good," analogous to a "zone of privacy." Thus, parallel to the 
Court in Griswold and Eisenstadt, the rabbinic authorities in-
ferred from the nature of the enumerated laws a number of un-
enumerated interpersonal obligations falling within the zone of 
the good and the just, such as according neighbors the right of 
first refusal on land, dressing and speaking in a respectful man-
ner, and behaving courteously in litigious settings.54 
It should be noted that, although the phrase "the just and 
the good" does appear in the text of the Torah, its interpretative 
methodology is closer to the constitutional interpretation of 
"privacy" than to that of "liberty." Unlike the phrase "liberty," 
and, indeed, unlike the phrase "be holy," religious authorities 
did not point to historical definitions or traditions that would 
help elucidate the meaning of the words "just" and "good." 
Rather, using a technique more similar to the Court's approach 
to the broad concept of privacy that emanated from specific 
guarantees, religious authorities looked to the underlying princi-
ples of "just and good" behavior that emanated from enumer-
ated interpersonal obligations, then applied those principles to 
situations which were not addressed in the text. Thus, just as the 
50. Nachmanides, 2 Commentary at 376 (cited in note 2X) (commenting on Deuter· 
anomy 6:1X) (citing Deuteronomy 6:17)). 
51. !d. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. (citing Leviticus 19:16, 18, 22). 
54. !d. 
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Court derived constitutional rights based on the broad and un-
enumerated concept of privacy, Jewish legal authorities derived 
a range of "just" and "good" behavior not found in the Biblical 
text but nevertheless required by the Torah. 
IV. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND "LOVE YOUR 
NEIGHBOR AS YOURSELF" 
Perhaps the broadest potential source of unenumerated 
constitutional rights is the Ninth Amendment, which states: "The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. "55 
Though the actual derivation of unenumerated human rights 
based on the Ninth Amendment has been controversial, on its 
face the Amendment clearly appears, as Justice Goldberg put it, 
to "show[] a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamen-
tal rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first 
eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included 
there not be deemed exhaustive."56 
Although the Court in Griswold referred to the Ninth 
Amendment as one source of penumbras contributing to the 
zone of privacy, the majority relied primarily on other parts of 
the Constitution to derive a right of privacy protecting the use of 
contraceptives. Justice Goldberg, however, in his concurring 
opinion, "emphasize( d) the relevance of th(e Ninth] Amendment 
to the Court's holding."57 Focusing on both the language and the 
history of the Ninth Amendment, Justice Goldberg concluded 
that "the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are ad-
ditional fundamental rights, protected from governmental in-
fringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights spe-
cifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional 
amendments."58 Indeed, Justice Goldberg argued that refusal to 
recognize the right of privacy in marriage because it is not men-
tioned explicitly in the first eight amendments "is to ignore the 
Ninth Amendment and give it no effect whatsoever," and, in fact 
"would violate the Ninth Amendment."59 
Despite the vitality of Justice Goldberg's arguments, how-
ever, his views did not prevail in Griswold and appear to have 
55. U.S. Const, Amend. IX. 
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,492 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
57. I d. at 487 (Goldberg, J ., concurring). 
58. ld. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
59. ld. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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had little influence on the Court's later decisions. Nevertheless, 
a number of constitutional scholars have advanced theories using 
the Ninth Amendment to derive unenumerated human rights. 
One of the most prominent and influential scholars in this en-
deavor has been Charles Black, whose declared aim is "the ra-
tional development of an open-edged corpus juris of human-
rights constitutional law. "00 Using arguments similar to Justice 
Goldberg's, Professor Black insists that 
preponderance of reason leaves us with the conclusion, about 
as well-supported as any we can reach in law, that the Ninth 
Amendment declares as a matter of law-of constitutional 
law, overriding other law- that some other rights are "re-
tained by the people," and that these shall be treated as on an 
equal footing with rights enumerated.61 
Black rejects the attitude of those who find application of 
the Ninth Amendment unworkable because "[w]e are not told 
what [the unenumerated rights] are" and thus claim that "no ac-
tion is possible, because you haven't been told exactly how to 
act."62 Instead, Black prescribes "tak[ing] the Ninth Amendment 
as a command to use any rational methods available to the art of 
law, and with these in hand to set out to discover what it is you 
are to protect. "63 In particular, Black envisions a constitutional 
imperative that would require "a radical redirection of theory 
and practice toward wiping out poverty."64 
To arrive at his view of a "constitutional justice of liveli-
hood," Black suggests that the Ninth Amendment "command[s] 
us to use the methods available within our legal system in an on-
going search for 'unenumerated' rights. "65 As a means for identi-
fying those rights, Black looks to the Declaration of Independ-
ence. Turning specifically to poverty and its effect on "Life, 
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," Black writes hauntingly 
that 
many people do die, quickly sometimes, sometimes more 
60. Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in Power 
and Policy in Quest of Law: Essays in Honor of Eugene Victor Rostow 187, 197 n* (M. 
McDougal & W.M. Reisman, eds., Martinos Nijhoff, 1985). 
61. ld. at 188. 
62. ld. at 188-89. 
63. ld. at 189. 
64. Charles L. Black, Jr., On Worrying About the Constitution, 55 U. Colo. L. Rev. 
469,471 {1984). 
65. Charles L. Black. Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Lh·eli-
hood, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1103,1104 (1986). 
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slowly, of poverty; poverty may be the leading cause of death. 
Liberty is very often made into a mocking simulacrum by 
poverty. But I would lay strongest stress on the phrase, "the 
pursuit of happiness." .... The possession of a decent mate-
rial basis for life is an indispensable condition, to almost all 
people and at almost all times, to this "pursuit." The lack of 
this basis-the thing we call "poverty" -is overwhelmingly, in 
the whole human world, the commonest, the grimmest, the 
stubbornest obstacle we know to the pursuit of happiness. I 
have suggested that poverty may be the leading cause of 
death; it is pretty certain that it is the leading cause, at least 
among material causes, of despair in life .... (T]he right to the 
pursuit of happiness is going to be, for all but a small minority 
of those in poverty, the palest grinning ghost of a right. 66 
Black also responds to those who would oppose his argu-
ments in favor of a constitutional justice of livelihood by asking 
"How much?" or "Where do you draw the line?" Focusing on 
the evils of poverty, Black writes powerfully that 
[w]hen we are faced with these difficulties of "how much," it 
is often helpful to step back and think small, and to ask not, 
"What is the whole extent of what we are bound to do?" but 
rather, "What is the clearest thing we ought to do first?" 
When we descend to that level, one reasonable answer occurs. 
Somebody's count (in 1985] is that a million and a half people 
in the State of New York are undernourished; somebody 
else's count is that 13% of the American people live in pov-
erty, which pretty much always implies hunger more or less 
serious. This hunger is disproportionately high among chil-
dren; about half our black children under six lived in poverty 
in 1984. Some helpless old people eat dog food when they can 
get it .... Now you can bog down in a discussion about the 
exact perimeter of "decent livelihood," or you can cease for a 
moment from that commonly diversionary tactic and note 
that, wherever the penumbra may be, malnourished people 
are not enjoying a decent livelihood.67 
While Black's eloquent testimony about poverty may make 
academic any questions about where to draw the line in guaran-
teeing a justice of livelihood, his critics do express a valid con-
cern for the need to identify limits to the obligations that are im-
plied by the Ninth Amendment. Even an open-ended corpus of 
human rights must acknowledge that not all imagined rights can 
66. !d. at 1105-06. 
67. ld. at 1114-15 (footnotes omitted). 
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be guaranteed by the Constitution. There must be some lines 
drawn and limitations recognized in what can be expected and 
required of society. Nevertheless, these considerations do not 
invalidate Black's call for an acceptance of the Ninth Amend-
ment as a general command to discover and protect unenumer-
ated human rights. In fact, a possible parallel to his approach 
may be found in the Biblical command to "Love your neighbor 
as yourself." 
Together with enumerated commandments dealing with in-
terpersonal relationships and the commandment to do the "just" 
and the "good," the Torah contains a broad commandment gov-
ernino interpersonal conduct, "Love your neighbor as your-
self."iB Parallel to the Ninth Amendment in Professor Black's 
system, this commandment is understood by Jewish religious 
authorities to clearly indicate that, in addition to the interper-
sonal obligations listed in the Biblical text, there are other obli-
gations incumbent on an individual to comply with loving one's 
neighbor as one's self. Moreover, just as Black emphasized that 
he considered his interpretation of the Ninth Amendment to be 
grounded in a basic analysis of American constitutional law, the 
Talmudic sage Rabbi Akiva emphasized the significance of the 
command to "love your neighbor" in Jewish Law, referring to it 
as "a fundamental principle in the Torah.""y 
Perhaps the most striking similarity between the com-
mandment to "love your neighbor" and the Ninth Amendment 
is the broad language used in both phrases. It is the broad refer-
ence to "other [rights] retained by the people" 70 that leads Black 
to consider the Ninth Amendment to be the basis for "the ra-
tional development of an open-edged corpus juris of human-
rights constitutional law. "71 Toward that end, Black sees an obli-
gation to search for and discover unenumerated human rights 
that the Constitution protects. 
Likewise, the broad language of the phrase "love your 
neighbor as yourself" implies an obligation to identify unenu-
merated obligations that would express loving one's neighbor as 
one's self, and then to treat others as one would wish to be 
treated. Indeed, in his Code of Law, Maimonides cites Talmudic 
sources which list some examples of conduct required by the 
61{. Levilicus 19:11{. 
69. See Rashi, Commenlary on lhe Torah (commenting on Levilicus 19:18) (quoting 
Torath Kohanim). 
70. U.S. Canst., Amend. IX. 
71. Black, On Reading and Using lhe Nimh Amendmen1 (cited in note 60). 
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command, including speaking words of praise for others and 
being concerned for the monetary welfare of others, just as one 
would seek one's own honor and be concerned for one's own fi-
nancial well-being.72 Emphasizing the importance of these prin-
ciples, Maimonides quotes the Talmudic statement that "one 
who gains honor through disgracing another has no place in the 
World to Come."73 
Despite the broad obligation to love one's neighbor as one's 
self, though, the commandment has one more element in com-
mon with the Ninth Amendment. Although the Ninth Amend-
ment, according to Black and others, mandates the identification 
of a wide range of human rights not enumerated in the constitu-
tional text, there are limits on what rights society will recognize 
and protect. Likewise, there are limits to the conduct required 
as part of loving one's neighbor as one's self. For example, as 
Nachmanides notes in his Biblical commentary, the Talmud con-
cludes that preserving one's own life takes precedence over pre-
serving the life of another.74 Indeed, on a more general level, 
Nachmanides suggests that the Torah's commandment to love 
others as one's self should be understood more in the nature of a 
goal than an actual requirement, because he finds it psychologi-
cally unfeasible that the Torah would obligate individuals trul~ 
to love others to the same degree as they love themselves. 5 
Thus, a final similarity between the Ninth Amendment and this 
commandment appears to be that, although there are limits on 
the scope of each principle, an honest evaluation of human na-
ture suggests that the more relevant question in each case is usu-
ally not going to be "How much?" but rather "where do we 
start?" 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 1987, Professor William Wagner wrote of the "apparent 
crisis that has emerged in the Nation's understanding of civil 
rights law" which prompted the Columbus School of Law, 
Catholic University, to conduct a symposium addressing the re-
lationship between religion and human rights.7b The symposium 
72. See Maimonides, Laws of De'oth at 6:3 (cited in note 30). 
73. Id. 
74. Nachmanides, Commentary on the Torah at 119 (cited in note 28) (commenting 
on Leviticus 19: 17). 
75. See id. 
76. See William Joseph Wagner, Reflections on the Symposium: An Ordered In-
quiry Into the Relation of Civil Rights Law and Religion, 5 J.L. & Rei. 5 (1987). 
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produced a variety of illuminating papers and discussions identi-
fying a religious basis for human rights. At the same time, how-
ever, Professor Wagner acknowledged that the symposium was 
founded upon certain presuppositions, two of which, in particu-
lar, are not shared by all legal theorists. One presupposition, 
"that the law's meaning and validity requires grounding in an ex-
tralegal source," apparently contradicts positivist viewpoints.77 
The symposium's "further presupposi[tion] that religion can 
serve, if only in some attenuated sense, as such a source of 
meaning and validity," contradicts the view that "religion is in 
principle not suited to this role, e.g., the position that religion is a 
private preference unrelated to the public meaning of civil 
rights. "78 
To the extent that these two presuppositions remain contro-
versial among legal theorists, despite its significance, the sympo-
sium was inevitably limited in the influence it was able to exert 
on legal discourse. The aim of this Essay is to carry forward the 
pursuit of advancing the discussion of human rights through an 
examination of religious texts, while avoiding the controversial 
elements of the approach propounded at the symposium. To-
ward that end, the Essay looks to a religious text, the Torah, not 
as a substantive source of human rights law, but instead as a 
model of an authoritative legal text that must be interpreted to 
serve as a foundation for a living community. In so doing, the 
Essay builds on the work of several prominent American legal 
scholars who have compared constitutional textual analysis to 
Biblical hermeneutics. Thus, while the approach offered in this 
Essay may raise questions of its own, the emphasis on textual 
analysis rather than on substantive law adds a new dimension to 
the discussion of the relationship between religion and human 
rights, through a method that may prove to be more acceptable 
among legal theorists. 
77. Id. at 9. 
78. ld. 
